Land & Water Law Review
Volume 19

Issue 2

Article 19

1984

Constitutional Law - Double Jeopardy - The New Role of Double
Jeopardy in Capital Sentencing - Hopkinson v. State
Elizabeth Z. Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Smith, Elizabeth Z. (1984) "Constitutional Law - Double Jeopardy - The New Role of Double Jeopardy in
Capital Sentencing - Hopkinson v. State," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 19 : Iss. 2 , pp. 743 - 754.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol19/iss2/19

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Smith: Constitutional Law - Double Jeopardy - The New Role of Double Jeo
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-The New Role of Double
Jeopardy In Capital Sentencing. Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43 (Wyo.
1983).
In 1983, the Wyoming Supreme Court again heard arguments concerning the death sentence imposed on convicted killer Mark Hopkinson.1 The
bizarre facts in the Hopkinson murder story can only be briefly summarized. 2 In 1975, Mark Hopkinson and his family became entangled in a
legal dispute over water rights with their neighbors in Uinta County.8 The
neighbors were represented by Vincent Vehar, an Evanston attorney. As
the legal battle developed the friction between Hopkinson and Vehar intensified. Ultimately, Hopkinson decided to have Vehar killed.
During the summer of 1977, Hopkinson hired an accomplice and
directed him to place a bomb in the basement of the Vehar residence. In the
early morning hours of Sunday, July 7th, 1977, the cohort executed the
bombing plan. Vehar, his wife, and one son perished in the explosion.
Approximately one year later, Jeff Green, a former Hopkinson friend
and employee, served as a major witness in the trial of another of Hopkinson's associates. During the trial, Green broke down and implicated
Hopkinson in numerous crimes, including the Vehar murders. His
testimony resulted in a federal grand jury indictment and the subsequent
conviction of Hopkinson on charges of interstate transportation of explosives. 4 Hopkinson was sentenced and confined to a federal minimum
security prison in Lompoc, California.5 From the Lompoc prison, Hopkinson made a series of phone calls 6 establishing a plan to murder Jeff Green.
On May 20th, 1979, Jeff Green's mutilated body was discovered in Bridger
Valley in southern Wyoming.
Four months later, Mark Hopkinson was brought to trial on multiple
charges including the first degree murders of the Vehars and Jeff Green.'
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all of the charges. 8 In the second phase
of the bifurcated trial9 Hopkinson was sentenced to three consecutive
terms of life imprisonment for the Vehar murders and condemned to die for
the torture killing of Jeff Green. 10
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and
the life sentences. However, because of an error in the sentencing verdict
form the court reversed the imposition of the death penalty for the Jeff
1. Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43 (Wyo. 1983).
2. Id. at 48-51.
3. Id. at 48.
4. United States v. Hopkinson, 631 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 969
(1981).
5. 664 P.2d at 49.
6. In a time span of two months Mark Hopkinson made a total of 114 calls from the prison.
See, e.g., Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 96 (Wyo. 1981).
7. Id. at 97.
8. Id.
9. A Wyoming statute requires that when a defendant is convicted of first degree murder
the judge must conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether to impose a
penalty of life imprisonment or death. See Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-102(a) (1977) (now recodified
as Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(a) (1977)).
10. 632 P.2d at 97.
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was remanded to the district court for a new
Green murder." The case 12
capital sentencing hearing.
A new jury was impaneled for the purpose of setting sentence on the
first degree murder conviction for the death of Jeff Green. The evidence
produced during the guilt phase of the original trial was not reintroduced to
the new jury. Instead, the jurors were informed of most of the circumstances surrounding the murder through excerpts from the transcript
of the original trial. The prosecution then submitted evidence to the second
sentencing jury of five statutory aggravating factors which would indicate
the need for the death penalty. This included evidence of two aggravating
circumstances the first sentencing jury had deemed inapplicable to the
facts of the case. Based on that evidence, the second jury recommended the
death penalty. 18 On appeal, Hopkinson argued that the submission to the
second sentencing jury of those aggravating circumstances found inapplicable in the first sentincing hearing 14 violated his fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy. The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that
there could not be an acquittal from an aggravating circumstance in the
penalty phase of a bifurcated proceeding.' s Therefore, a statutory aggravating circumstance submitted but not found to exist in the first trial
could be resubmitted and proven at6 the second hearing without subjecting
the defendant to double jeopardy.1
This Note will briefly review major constitutional developments in the
capital sentencing hearing, the standardization of sentencing procedure,
and the resulting similarities to criminal trial procedure. The trial-like
nature of the capital sentencing hearing will be shown to be particularly important in terms of the application of double jeopardy safeguards. The
focus will then turn to the Hopkinsoncourt's refusal to expand the scope of
fifth amendment double jeopardy 17
protections to death penalty hearings
provided for in Wyoming statutes.
11. Id. at 169-72. In the first Hopkinson trial the sentencing verdict form stated "[the jury
members] do find the existence of the following aggravating circumstances at the time of
the murders .. " The court said this was not a proper introduction to the second aggravating circumstance on the verdict form, which had requested that the jury indicate
whether, "[tlhe Defendant was previously convicted of another murder in the first degree
or a felony involving the use of threat or violence to the person."
The sentencing jury found this second aggravating circumstance was present in the
murder of JeffGreen. But, the court stated that contrary to the sentencing form's introductory statement, there was no evidence introduced from which the jury could condude that the requisite convictions occurred prior to the Jeff Green murder. The state
had introduced evidence that the Vehar murders had been committed prior to the Jeff
Green murder. However, the sentencing verdict form required that the jury find that the
convictions occurred prior to Green's murder. The court held the evidence produced at
trial did not support the jury's response to the verdict form and remanded for a new
sentencing hearing.
12. Id. at 172. See also Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(a) (1977).
13. Hopldnson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 47 (Wyo. 1983).
14. The Wyoming capital sentencing statute provides a list of eight aggravating circumstances, one of which must be proven before a death sentence may be imposed. See
infra note 71.
15. 664 P.2d 43 at 48, 68-71.
16. Id. at 68-71.
17. The Wyoming capital sentencing scheme is outlined in Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-2-101 to -103
(1977). See infra note 71.
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Finally, an analysis of the reasoning of a recent state supreme court
decision will be presented which holds the resubmission in a capital
resentencing hearing of an aggravating circumstance found inapplicable in
the first penalty trial is a violation of the fifth amendment prohibition
against double jeopardy. 18
THE STANDARDIZATION OF CAPITAL SENTENCING

The United States Constitution's eighth amendment prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishment" was adopted in the Bill of Rights
in 1791. One hundred and eighty one years later in the landmark decision of
Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court ruled, per curiam,
that that clause restricted the state's imposition of the death penalty.' 9
In the four years following Furman, the constitutional status of the
death penalty remained uncertain. Nonetheless, it was a period
characterized by a virtual stampede of state reenactments of the death
penalty.20 Then, in July of 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia2l and its four companion cases,2 2 the Supreme Court commanded by a centrist plurality consisting of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, again addressed the issue
of the constitutionality of the death penalty. The Court held that the death
penalty was not per se unconstitutional. However, the plurality cautioned
that central to their holding was "the conviction that the vesting of stanpower violates the eighth and fourteenth
dardless sentencing
23
amendments."
Accordingly, the Court reviewed five capital sentencing statutes
enacted in response to Furman and upheld three 24 as insuring that the
sentence of death would not be "wantonly or freakishly imposed. ' 25 Those
statutes receiving the Court's approval were similar to one another in format and provided: 1) a bifurcated proceeding with separate trials for guilt
and sentencing; 2) that the burden of proof rest with the prosecution in
both guilt and sentencing phases; 3) a list of aggravating factors at least
one of which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury can
impose a death sentence; 4) a list of mitigating factors to be weighed and
balanced with the aggravating factors in determining sentence; and 5) an
automatic review of all death sentences by the state's highest court.2 6 The
18. State v. Silhan, 275 S.E.2d 450 (N.C. 1981).
19. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Furnnmajority was badly divided. A weakly bound plurality
of three denounced discretionary jury sentencing. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id.
at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring). The plurality was joined by concurring Justices Brennan and Marshall who ruled that death penalties were per
se unconstitutional. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 314 (Marshall, J.,

concurring).
20. The legislature of 35 states, including Wyoming, enacted new death penalty statutes in
the years 1972-1976. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976).
21. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
22. Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
23. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976).
24. The statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas were upheld as constitutional. See supranote
21 and accompanying text.
25. 428 US. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
26. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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Court indicated the purpose of requiring such factors was to provide the
sentencing authority with specific guidelines to assist in reaching an informed decision. The immediate response of the rest of the states'
legislators was the virtual adoption of the Gregg statute. This resulted in
nationwide standardization of the capital sentencing proceeding.
Wyoming's Response to Furman
In 1977, the Wyoming Legislature, prompted by the Wyoming
Supreme Court, 2 enacted a new capital punishment statute patterned
after the sentencing procedures upheld in Gregg. Wyoming's present
statutory plan provides that all defendants convicted of first degree
murder will be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. 28 The sentencing
hearing is conducted separately, before a judge29 or jury,' 0 and all evidence
relevant to the sentence, including matters pertaining to any of the
statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstances, are presented. 8 1
After hearing all the evidence, the jury is directed to deliberate on the
issue of proper sentence. In making that determination the jurors are to
consider whether one or more aggravating circumstances have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and whether the mitigating circumstances
outweigh the aggravating circumstances.8 2 The death penalty may not be
imposed unless the jury determines at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances has been proven.33
A jury verdict in favor of a capital sentence must be designated in
writing8 ' and is binding upon the judge. 5 Life imprisonment will be
automatically imposed if the jury cannot agree upon a verdict within a
6
reasonable time.
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are subject to
automatic review by the Wyoming Supreme Court. 7 Upon appeal the court
has authority to remand for additional proceedings because of error, affirm
the death sentence, or set the sentence aside and impose a penalty of life
imprisonment. 8
Double Jeopardy in StandardizedCapitalSentencing
The moral sentiment double jeopardy exemplifies is the conviction that
no man should suffer twice for a single act. 89 That sentiment attained Constitutional status in the fifth amendment: "Nor shall any person be subject
27. In 1977, the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that the Wyoming statutory sentencing procedure, which provided for the mandatory imposition of the death penalty for a conviction
of first degree murder, was invalid. Kennedy v. State, 559 P.2d 1014 (Wyo. 1977).
28. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-101(b) (1977).
29. WYO.STAT. § 6-2-102(a) (i-iii) (1977).
30. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(b) (1977).
31. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(c) (1977).
32. WYo. STAT. § 6-2-102(d) (1977).
33. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(e) (1977).
34. Id.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(f) (1977).
WYO.STAT. § 6-2-102(e) (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-103(a) (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-103(e) (i-iii)
(1977).
SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, at V (1969).
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for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." As inter40
preted by the United States Supreme Court in North Carolinav. Pearce,
the double jeopardy clause affords the accused three protections: 1) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; 2) it
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
42
conviction;
and 3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same
48
offense.
However, in Pearce the central issue was whether double jeopardy afforded the same protections to the sentencing portion of the trial. The
defendant in Pearcein a post-conviction proceeding had his original conviction overturned. Upon remand he was convicted a second time and sen44
tenced to a longer prison term than had been imposed in the first trial.
The Pearce Court ruled that while the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment required that time already served must be fully credited in
imposing sentences, 45 double jeopardy protections were not violated by the
infliction of a more severe sentence on reconviction. 4" After Pearce, the
role of double jeopardy protection in sentencing was considered to be
minimal.
Another major decision involving the issue of double jeopardy protections in sentencing was that of United States v. DiFrancesco.4'7 The defendant in DiFrancescowas sentenced under the Organized Crime Act of 1970
as a "dangerous special offender."" A defendant so designated and convicted was to receive an enhanced sentence, 49 and if the United States felt
the sentence was not severe enough it had the right to appeal the sentence
to the United States Court of Appeals.50
The defendant claimed that the provision for appeal of his sentence
violated his constitutional safeguards against double jeopardy. The Court
rejected the double jeopardy argument stating the sentencing procedure
did not approximate the ordeal of a trial on the basic issue of guilt or innocence. 51 In support of this conclusion the Court considered a number of
factors: 1) historically, a judge-mandated increase in sentencing was not
thought to violate double jeopardy; 2) the appeal was on the record of the
trial court; 3) the defendant was charged with knowledge of the special offender statute and therefore had no expectations regarding the finality of
sentence until an appeal was taken; and 4) the appellate judge was allowed
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

395 U.S. 711 (1969).
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
In Re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1879).
Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1873).
395 U.S. at 711. The defendant in Pearcewas originally sentenced for a term of twelve to
fifteen years. In the second trial he was sentenced to an eight year prison term. When
added to the time he had already spent in prison, this sentence amounted to a longer total
sentence than had originally been imposed.
45. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969).
46. Id. at 720, 723.
47. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e), (f) (1982).
49. Id.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1982).
51. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980).
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to choose from a wide range of sentences as opposed to a trial on the merits
where only one of two outcomes was possible.5 2 For these reasons the
Court held that the imposition of a sentence under the Organized Crime
Act did not have the qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal at trial and therefore, the government's appeal of the sentence did
not subject the defendant to double jeopardy.58
After the DiFrancescodecision, the argument that the double jeopardy
clause might offer some restrictions in capital resentencing lost much of its
the issue was revived in the landvalidity. However, in the spring of 1981
4
mark case of Buttington v. Missouri.
In BuUington,the defendant was convicted of first degree murder.5 5 At
a separate sentencing phase provided for in response to Gregg, the jury was
presented with two alternative choices. The defendant could receive the
punishment of life imprisonment or he could be sentenced to die.5 6 After
reviewing and weighing the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the jury recommended that the defendant receive a life
sentence. 57 However, the trial court then granted defendant's motion for a
new trial because of error in the guilt phase of the proceedings.5 8 The state
filed notice that it again intended to seek the death penalty. 9 The trial
court ruled that it would not allow the death penalty to be imposed because
to do so would violate double jeopardy standards.6 0 The prosecution then
applied for a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from entering a
formal order which would deny it the right to again seek the death
penalty. 61 The Missouri Supreme Court granted the state's request.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court analyzed earlier decisions addressing double jeopardy concerns in resentencing and concluded
that the sentencing procedure in Bullington was significantly different
and DiFrancescowhere
than those employed in previous cases like Pearce
62
double jeopardy had been found not to attach.
Most importantly, in Pearce the state had only recommended a
sentence and was not required to carry the burden of proof in the determination of exactly what sentence was proper.68 However in BuUingtonthe
state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at
52. Id. See also Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438-41 (1981). The Bullington Court
stated there was at least one other factor that contributed to the holding in Di.Fr"anesco.
The DiFrancescoCourt said that because the appeal under the Organized Crime Act did
not have the hallmarks of a trial on the merits, double jeopardy did not apply. Id. at 440.
The BuUington Court reasoned this was due in part to the fact that the state's standard of
proof in DiFrancescowas by the preponderance of the evidence, rather than the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard required in a criminal trial. Id. at 441.
53. Id. at 438-41.
54. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
55. Id. at 435.
56. 451 U.S. at 432. See also Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.008.1 (1978).
57. 451 U.S. at 436.
58. Id. at 436.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61.Id.
62. Id. at 438.
63. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980).
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least one statutory aggravating circumstance in order bto obtain a death
sentence." In Bullington the jury was not required to choose from a wide
8
Like a
range of possible sentences, 5 unlike the judge in DiFrancesco.6
trial on the merits, only one of the two outcomes would be possible. For
these reasons the majority in Bullington held that the Missouri sentencing
procedure, standardized by the Court's earlier capital penalty decisions,
had all the ingredients of a trial on the merits and double jeopardy protec-

tions would attach.6 7

In so holding, the Court extended at least one of the three double
65
to the capital sentencing hearjeopardy protections announced in Pearce
ing. The Court held that a life sentence was essentially an acquittal of the
death penalty, and the rule that double jeopardy prohibits a prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal would apply. Since the state had been
given one fair opportunity to prove its case, double jeopardy would prevent
it from being afforded another in which it could utilize the experience and
superior knowledge gained from the first sentencing hearingA
Double Jeopardy and Hopkinson
In the first Hopkison sentencing hearing the jury was instructed on
eight of the ten statutory aggravating circumstances.7 0 After deliberating,
64. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981). See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.001

(1978).

65. Id.
66. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980).
67. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. at 431,438,446 (1981). InBullington, the court analogized the separate sentencing phase to a trial on the merits. This analogy furthered two conclusions. First, it served to distinguish the Budlington case from prior cases like Pearce
and DiFancescowhich held that double jeopardy protections did not apply to sentencing.
Second, the court said, "by enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial
on the issue of guilt or innocence, Missouri explicitly requires that the jury determine
whether the prosecution has proven its case." A sentence of life imprisonment meant that
the prosecution has not proven its case on the issue of the death penalty and the defendant must be acquitted of the death penalty. Double jeopardy will attach to that acquittal
and prevent the state from again seeking the death penalty if the court remands for a new
sentencing trial.
68. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
69. 451 U.S. at 446.
70. Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 92, 111 (Wyo. 1983) (Rose, J., dissenting). Subsections
(h) and (j) of section 64-102 (recodified as 6-2-102) of the Wyoming statutes provide for
the following mitigating and aggravating circumstances:
(h) Aggravating circumstances are limited to the following.
(i) The murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment;
(ii) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder in the first
degree or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person;
(iii) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more
persons;
(iv) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual assault, arson,
burglary, kidnapping or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing
or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;
(v) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody;
(vi) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain;
(vii) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel;
(viii) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney,
former district attorney, or former county and prosecuting attorney, during or because of the exercise of his official duty.
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the jury determined that only four aggravating circumstances had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.71 In the second sentencing hearing the
state was allowed to resubmit two of the aggravating circumstances the
first jury had held inapplicable. 72 This time, the jury found such factors did
exist beyond a reasonable doubt.78
On appeal from the second sentencing hearing, Hopkinson contended
that the resubmission of the statutory aggravating circumstances violated
his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. By way of answer the
court stated: "the principal reason [the second jury found such circumstances to exist] is probably because the jury was inadequately instructed in the first trial, but we need not guess any further or even at
al]."74

The court then reviewed a number of major rulings on double jeopardy
protections in the sentencing hearing. This included a review of Bullington
which held that a jury verdict of a life sentence was essentially an acquittal
of the death penalty and therefore double jeopardy would prevent the state
from again seeking the death penalty on remand.7 5 But the Wyoming
Supreme Court declined to extend that holding to the situation at bar,
although in Hopkinson the first sentencing jury had acquitted the defendant of two aggravating circumstances either one of which would support
the
the death penalty. Instead, the court held that the State could submit
76
same aggravating circumstances to the second sentencing jury.
The Hopkinson court declined to extend the Bullington holding for two
reasons: The first jury in Hopkinson, unlike the jury in Bullington, did not
return a sentence of life imprisonment. 77 Second, the Hopkinson court also
distinguished Bullington by classifying a statutory aggravating circumstance as merely an issue of fact. An issue of fact, the court said, does
not command the same degree of finality as a finding of guilt, or the setting
of a sentence as in Bullington.7 8 Having found no persuasive authority that
there was or should be any restriction on statutory required findings of
Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(i) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(ii) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(i) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to
the act;
(iv) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor;
(v) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person;
(vi) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired;
(vii) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
71. 664 P.2d 43, 69 (Wyo. 1983).
72. Id. The first jury had found Wyo. STAT. S 6-2-102(h) (v, vi) inapplicable. See supra note
71.
73. 664 P.2d at 69.
74. Id.
75. 451 U.S. at 446.
76. 664 P.2d at 69.
77. Id. at 70.
78. Id.
(j)

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol19/iss2/19

8

Smith: Constitutional Law - Double Jeopardy - The New Role of Double Jeo
1984

CASE NOTES

fact'79 the court concluded that double jeopardy principles were not
violated by the resubmission of those aggravating circumstances held not
to exist in the first trial.80
ANALYSIS
Although both factors enumerated by the Wyoming court do
distinguish Hopkinson from Buldington, it is at least arguable that the
United States Supreme Court in Bullington did not intend that the application of double jeopardy protections would depend on the actual sentence
given. The Bullington Court felt that because the capital sentencing procedure resembled a trial on the merits and particularly because the prosecution had to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, double jeopardy
protections would prohibit the state from attempting to reprove its case. In
Hopkinson, the following procedures were required for each statutory aggravating circumstance submitted to the jury: First, the state was required
to present evidence supporting the existence of the statutory circumstance.
Second, the state was required to prove the existence of that circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, the jury function, like that of a jury in
trial on the merits, was to determine which of two outcomes was indicated
by the evidence. Either a statutory aggravating cicrumstance would be
proven applicable, or the defendant would essentially be acquitted of that
particular aggravating circumstance.
The statutory aggravating circumstance, viewed in this way, is not just
an issue of fact-contrary to the reasoning in Hopkinson. This argument is
buttressed by the holdings in Furmanand Gregg which stressed the importance and necessity of the jury finding a statutory aggravating factor
before imposing the death penalty, and that the state has the burden of proving the existence of that factor.
In other words, the procedure in determining whether a statutory aggravating circumstance does, or does not apply, resembles a trial within
the sentencing trial. Bullington held that double jeopardy would attach to
the sentencing phase of a bifurcated proceeding because it had all the
elements of a trial on the merits. Similarly, in Hopkinson double jeopardy
should attach to a jury acquittal of a statutory aggravating circumstance to
prevent the state from attempting to reprove it at a new sentencing
hearing.
The Hopkinson majority also cited Knapp v. Cardwell, a 1982 federal
district court case, as supportive of the holding in Hopkinson."' However,
as Justice Rose aptly pointed out in his dissent in Hopkinson, that case is inapplicable to the holding in Hopkinson. 2 The Knapp decision stands for the
proposition that double jeopardy notions are not violated when the state introduces an aggravating circumstance at a capital resentencing trial that
was not submitted to the jury at the first trial.83 In Hopkinson, the same
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (Court construes Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982)).
82. 664 P.2d at 120 (Rose, J., dissenting).
83. 667 F.2d at 1265.
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aggravating circumstances were submitted to the jury in the second trial as
in the first trial.8 4 Since the first jury in Knapp never tried the issue of
whether the aggravating circumstances existed there could be no acquittal.
This is unlike the situation in Hopkinson where there was actually a trial
and an acquittal. Without an acquittal the rule stated in Pearce: "double
jeopardy protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
an acquittal, "85 does not apply. Thus, Knapp did not address the Hopkinson
situation, and lent little authoritative value to the majority's opinion.
However, the majority also relied on State v. Gilbert, which is supportive of the Hopkinson holding. 86 In Gilbert, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina held that the failure of the first sentencing jury to find for or
against the defendant on an aggravating circumstance did not preclude the
submission of the same circumstance at the second trial on the basis of double jeopardy. 87 The Gilbert majority, like that in Hopkinson, felt there could
not be a violation of double jeopardy protections when two sentencing
juries had decided death was the appropriate sanction. 88
There is at least one factor in the Gilbert decision which undermines it
as an authority in Hopkinson. The Gilbert court suggested that in the event
one aggravating circumstance could not be resubmitted for constitutional
reasons, but other valid statutory aggravating circumstances were proved
to exist, then a sufficient basis existed for the application of the death
penalty. 89 Based partly on that assumption the Gilbert court ruled the
resubmission of an aggravating circumstance the first jury had found did
not exist was permissible.
In the first Hopkinson decision the court had expressly rejected that
reasoning stating: "when we do not know whether the result of the
weighing process would have been different had the impermissible aggravating circumstance not been present, and where a man's life is at
stake, we must return the case to the trial court for a new sentencing
trial." 90 Thus, the Gilbert holding was premised on a conclusion which the
Wyoming court had already deemed dangerously unacceptable. For this
reason the Hopkinsoncourt should have given little weight to the holding in
Gilbert.
The Better Reasoned Case: State v. Silhan
In March of 1981, just two months after the Bullingtondecision was announced, the North Carolina Supreme Court rendered a decision on double
jeopardy issues in capital sentencing in State v. Silhan.91 Bullington was
not cited by the Silhan court, but after careful consideration of recent
changes in capital sentencing procedures the court independently reached
the same result. The standardized capital sentencing procedures had
transformed the sentencing hearing into a trial where the jury had much
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

664 P.2d at 69.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
277 S.C. 53, 283 S.E.2d 179 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982).
283 S.E.2d at 182.
Id. See also Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 70 (Wyo. 1983).
283 S.E.2d at 182.
632 P.2d at 171-72.
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the same kind of duty it had in determining defendant's guilt or
innocence. 92
The Silhan court cited three functional tasks the capital sentencing
jury must perform and analogized them to the function of jurors in a
criminal trial on the merits: 93 1) the state must prove and the jury must find
beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances; 2) the aggravating circumstances found to exist must be sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty; and 3) the
mitigating circumstances must be found insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
Since the capital punishment hearing was in substance a trial on the
issue of sentence, the court concluded that the double jeopardy 9clause
4
placed limitations on the state in a new capital sentencing hearing.
The first of these limitations was the same limitation announced in
Bullington.9 5 When a life sentence is imposed following a conviction of a
capital crime, and the conviction is reversed and remanded to the trial
96
court for a new trial, the state may not again seek the death penalty.
Second, if a defendant appealed the death sentence and the case was
remanded for a new sentencing hearing, the state would be precluded from
circumstance deemed inapplicable by judge or
relying on any aggravating
7
jury in the first hearing.
The second limitation was based on the following reasoning: The
existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance is essential to a jury
finding that the death penalty is appropriate. In addition, the state has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a statutory
aggravating factor. Therefore, the process involved in the determination of
the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance is like that of a
criminal trial.98 Double jeopardy would prohibit the state from a second
chance at proving its case when it had offered insufficient evidence in the
first criminal sentencing trial. 9 So, logically, the jury's failure to find the
existence of an aggravating circumstance after considering it would be tantamount to the defendant's having been acquitted of the circumstance.100
The Silhan court then proposed comprehensive guidelines to determine
whether to remand for a new capital sentencing hearing without violating
the double jeopardy clause.' 01 If upon a defendant's appeal the court
vacates a death sentence because of trial error, it will remand for a new
sentencing hearing only if statutory aggravating circumstances exist which
91. 275 S.E.2d 450 (N.C. 1981).
92. Id. at 482-83.
93. Id. at 482.
94. Id.
95. See supra text accompanying note 57.
96. 275 S.E.2d at 482.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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would not be constitutionally or legally prohibited. 10 2 An aggravating circumstance would be proscribed at a new hearing if: a) there was not sufficient evidence to support it at the hearing appealed from; or, b) the jury at
the hearing appealed from failed to find that it existed; or, c) there would be
some other legal impediment.10 3
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that the resubmission, in a
capital sentencing hearing, of a statutory aggravating circumstance found
not to exist in the first trial is not a violation of double jeopardy principles.
The court reasoned that the determination of whether an aggravating circumstance is applicable to the case is an issue of fact. Since there cannot be
an acquittal from an issue of fact, the court concluded, there cannot be an
acquittal of a statutory aggravating circumstance.
There are two flaws in this rationale. The United States Supreme
Court has held that double jeopardy protections will apply to capital
resentencing hearings because these hearings have all the elements of a
trial in the merits. Similarly, determining whether a statutory aggravating
circumstance applies has all the elements of a trial on the merits.
Therefore, double jeopardy should prevent the resubmission of an aggravating circumstance where one jury has already acquitted the defendant of that circumstance.
Though the Wyoming Supreme Court in the first Hopkinson decision
stressed that "When a man's life is at stake" those aggravating factors
submitted to the jury must rest on firm evidentiary grounds, the later
Hopkinson decision creates the following anamoly: The double jeopardy
clause would prohibit the State of Wyoming from retrying an individual on
a charge of speeding if a jury had acquitted him. However, the same clause
would not protect another man from the imposition of a death sentence
based on the finding of one statutory aggravating circumstance though one
jury has already acquitted him of the same circumstance.
ELIZABETH Z. SMITH

102. Id. at 483.
103. Id.
104. This will be true when the second sentencing jury finds that only one statutory aggravating circumstance exists; (assuming it is one that the first jury held inapplicable)
that circumstance will warrant the death penalty.
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